Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

Anita L. Barber (Dumesnil) v. Eugene L. Barber :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Connie L. Mower; Attorney for Respondent.
Richard L. Bird, Jr.; Richards, Bird and Kump P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Barber v. Barber, No. 880615 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1395

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court
of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

BHIEF

**Q(*\S*CA
1H TUi! UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ANITA L. BARBER (DUMESNIL),
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 880615-CA

vs.
Category No. 14(b)
EUGENE L. BARBER,
Defendant-Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DECREE AND JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE

Richard L. Bird, Jr.
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C.
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988
Attorneys for Appellant
Connie L. Mower
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

Attorney for Respondent

Fl
MAYJ?0 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PETITION FOR REHEARING

1

DISAGREEMENT WITH THE COURT'S STATEMENTS

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1987) . .

5

Crouch V. Crouch. 88 111.App.3d 426, 410 N.E.2d 580 . . .

5

Feliciano v. Roseman Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass.
1987)
Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P. 2d 669 (Utah 1985)
Joraensen v. Joraensen, 667 P.2d 22 (Utah 1983)

5
7
5

Layton vs. Lavton. 77 P. 2d 504

5

Mattes vs. Olearain, 79 P.2d 1177

5

Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982)

6

Scharf V. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah Sup.Ct.
1985)
Stewart v. Coffman. 748 P.2d 579, 580-581 (Utah App.
1988)
Western Kane County District v. Jackson Cattle Company.
744 P. 2d 1376 at 1377-1378 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1987)

4
4
4

PETITION FOR REHEARING
To have what counsel believed was a well-founded,
fully documented appeal declared frivolous was a shock•

The

Court's opinion makes short shrift of appellant's arguments and
statement of the case and ignores what appellant believed to be
a clear error of law.
A short analysis of the Court's opinion and comparison
with the issues as appellant believed they were presented is
made under a separate heading for the reason that the tone of
the Court's opinion is such that this analysis may be considered
by the Court to be a waste of time.
Appellant petitions the Court to reconsider and rehear
appellant's position that the Judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant against the appellant in the amount of $12,500 is
excessive and contrary to the evidence and the findings of fact.
This is one of the arguments which the Court's footnote disposes
of by stating,
These arguments clearly lack merit and do
not warrant discussion in this opinion.
This

matter

was

addressed

at

pages

26-28

of

appellant's Brief and mentioned briefly at pages 6, 12 and 24 of
respondent's Brief with no explanation or justification of an
amount of $12,500 as against the amount of $5,996 which was
expended by the defendant on improvements to appellant's home,
some of which added no value to the home.

-4This matter was brought to the attention of the trial
court in plaintiff's Memorandum of January 5, 1988 (R. 164-189)
as Point I in that Memorandum.
It is true that the main thrust of plaintiff's appeal
was the failure to distinguish between equities arising during
a period prior to cohabitation, during cohabitation, and after
marriage.

In reference to these matters, appellant's Brief

states at page 26:
But if plaintiff is wrong on both of the
foregoing points, the judgment of the trial
court still must be reversed because it is
not supported by the evidence.
An analysis of the evidence and of the findings is then made
which are herein stated.
The Second Amended

Findings of

Fact

(R.

285 at

288-289) include Findings 12e, f, g, h and i in the following
language:
e.
Defendant, with plaintiff and
plaintiff's sons' assistance doing much of
the work, paid for the finishing of three
rooms and partial bath in the basement of
the home at a cash cost of $4,496.00.
f.
After the three rooms were
finished, defendant's son Corey lived in
one of those rooms, also his son Michael
did so part of the time and in the summer
months, the other three children of the
defendant lived in the said rooms part of
the time.

-5g.
Defendant without plaintiff's
objection caused a patio to be added at a
cost of $650.00 for the kit, with the help
of plaintiff and plaintiff's sons, which
added a value of $1,500.00 to the appraisal
of the home.
h.
Defendant without objection by
plaintiff replaced a portion of the fence
at a cost of $350.00, which added nothing
to the appraised value of the home.
i.
Defendant without objection by
plaintiff replaced some shrubs and trees at
a cost of $500.00, which added nothing to
the appraised value of the home.
This same document, originally dated August 19, 1988
and signed by the Court October 4, 1988, included the following
conclusions of law:
6. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay
the defendant $7,500.00 for improvements
made in the basement of the home during the
time the parties lived together prior to
marriage.
7. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay
to the defendant $5,000.00 for improvements
made to the property at 5999 Monaco Circle
prior to marriage or during marriage,
consisting of the deck, the replacement of
a portion of the fence and replanting
portions of the landscaping.
Since there is no explanation in the record of the
jump in figures from the cash investment to the amount of the
judgment against the appellant, who will have to sell her home
to pay the judgment, the Court should either amend the judgment

-6or remand the case for evidence as to why the incongruity
between the findings, conclusions and judgment exists.
There cannot be much doubt that the judgment must be
supported by the findings of fact and that the conclusions of
law are entitled to no particular deference and will only be
reviewed for correctness in light of the findings of fact.
Western Kane County District v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d
1376 at 1377-1378 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1987); Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1985); Stewart v. Coffman, 748
P.2d 579, 580-581 (Utah App. 1988).
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE COURTIS STATEMENTS
The Court's opinion, appellant submits, does not
distinguish between the relationship between the parties before
the defendant moved into plaintiff's home, the situation which
existed while they were living together and while defendant's
children were utilizing the improvements made in the basement,
and the period of their short-lived marriage. Before the trial
court plaintiff took the position that there was a difference in
consequences depending on during which of those three periods
the event occurred. There was never a challenge to the right of
the Court to make a disposition of property including premarital
or separate property and the trial court never recognized any
distinction.

-7This Court's opinion gives the impression that when
gifts are made prior to cohabitation, more gifts are made and
improvements to the plaintiff's separate property are made
during

cohabitation

and

those

and

occurrences

during

the

marriage are all lumped together without any distinction.

The

opinion does not quite say that, but definitely gives that
impression. This was the plaintiff's experience with the trial
court.

It was never stated by the Court that there is no

distinction between consequences during cohabitation and during
marriage, and yet no distinction was ever recognized. The Court
cites Layton vs. Layton, 77 P.2d 504, and Mattes vs. Olearain,
79

P. 2d

1177,

which

were

cited

by

the

plaintiff,

as

distinguishing between distribution of the property of unmarried
cohabitants and distribution in divorce actions. The Court goes
on to suggest, although it does not precisely say so, that if
cohabitants
appellant

later marry, the distinction

cited

cases

where

cohabitation

is erased.
was

followed

The
by

marriage and where the distinction was not erased. Jorgensen v.
Joraensen, 667 P. 2d 22

(Utah 1983); Crouch v. Crouch, 88

Ill.App.3d 426, 410 N.E.2d 580; Feliciano v. Roseman Silver Co. ,
514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 1987).
The Supreme Court has divided separate property of one
spouse only upon a special showing.

Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d

-8133, 135 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1987); Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705
(Utah 1982).
No special showing was made in this case and this
Court finds none and ignores these precedents.
At

appellant's

first

divorce,

she

was

given

a

completely furnished and landscaped home, adequate for herself
and her children, together with alimony and support money and
she

had

earnings

from

occasional

employment.

During

cohabitation she continued to receive alimony and support money
and gave the defendant the benefit of a fine home with a small
mortgage and a low interest rate. Defendant knew appellant had
not worked and was not expected to work and cannot complain that
the balance of support for himself and the appellant was his
burden.
The District Court with Judge Dee presiding, awarded*
temporary alimony, which was never paid by the defendant.
Appellant was forced to find work and no bills incurred after
the separation

(except mortgage payments) were paid by the

defendant.
At the divorce the home was awarded to the plaintiff
but with a judgment against her in the amount of $12,500, which,
it is submitted, she has no means of paying without selling the
home.

This Court has frequently held that a division of

-9property will be examined to determine if it is equitable as to
the parties and leaves them able to enjoy substantially the
standard of living they enjoyed previously (Appellant's Brief,
pp. 33-38). Appellant requested this review by the Court and it
was not given in the opinion.

Appellant filed a Motion to

Reopen to present financial evidence to aid the Court in this
type of determination (R. 62-65); the motion was first granted
and later refused (R. 266-267) and this Court has affirmed that
refusal.
In the matter of cohabitation by the appellant with
one Joseph Garcia, it is true that the appellant admitted that
Joseph Garcia moved in with her in December 1986 when she was
receiving no support money from the defendant and was working at
low wages.

It is not the fact of cohabitation which the

appellant argued but the time of it.

Prior to December

appellant and Joseph Garcia had been friends and he had stayed
in her home some nights but had never lived there, for the
meaning of which appellant looked to this Court's decision in
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). These facts are set
out in appellant's Brief at pages 30-3 3.
Judge

Dee

awarded

temporary

alimony

and

gave a

judgment for temporary alimony in March 1985, with no suggestion
of termination at that time. Fixing the date thereafter was the

-10purpose of appellant's motion for new trial (R. 140, 142-143,
150-163) giving evidence from other persons, some of them
definitely not interested persons, bearing on the date that
Joseph Garcia moved into the home at Monaco Circle.

The

testimony of Kounalis is analyzed at pages 11-12, 18-19, 30-31
of appellant's Brief.

It was general, referred only to the

coming and going of Joseph Garcia (Finding 24), and nothing to
indicate

that he was

anything

but

a friend

with

limited

privileges. Why was this question examined and the requirements
analyzed in Haddow v. Haddow and not in this case?
The divorce was granted in March 1985 with a judgment
for temporary alimony to that date.

Finding 25 says:

* * * After the parties separation in 1983
and Divorce in 1985, plaintiff began to
cohabit with Joe Garcia * * *
It is admitted that it was "after" those dates and fixing the
date was important.

The plaintiff, her sons and Joseph Garcia

testified that moving in and living in occurred in December 1986
(Tr. 57, 26-28, 176-177, 189-190)
a date.

There is no other fixing of

Because of the absence of impartial evidence that it

was not before December 1986, plaintiff filed a motion for
partial new trial supported by affidavit of neighbor, sister,
and friends of Joseph Garcia including a former girl friend (R.
140, 142-143, 150-163).

-11Appellant submits that these distinctions in relationships are meaningful in the law. Cohabitation without marriage
has become common and the distinction between living together
and marriage has been preserved by most courts. Some cases rely
on

an

agreement

made

between

the

parties; some

rely

on

compensation for services rendered; and none that we have found
simply put the parties at risk.
Appellant's counsel submits that his efforts to obtain
a decision distinguishing between these various relationships is
not frivolous but is important.
If the Court's holding that this is a frivolous appeal
is based on the belief that it was filed for an extension of
time, it is ironic.

During the entire trial plaintiff was

battling against time to bring the matter to a conclusion and
the delays were on the part of the other side. A cash bond has
been posted to protect the defendant.

The judgment is bearing

twelve percent interest and there is only disadvantage to the
appellant in this appeal and in this Petition.
DATED this 29th day of May, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P . C .
RICHARD L BIRD, JR

By:
Richard L. Bird, Jr.
Attorney for Appellant

-12I hereby certify that this Petition is not filed for
delay, but in the good faith belief and opinion that defendant's
judgment should be reduced and that the Court should reconsider
the denial of other relief to the appellant.
RICHARD L BIRD, JR

RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing PETITION FOR
REHEARING was served on the defendant-respondent this 29th day
of May, 1990, by mailing a true and correct copy thereof via
United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Connie L.
Mower, Esquire, 623 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
RICHARD L BIRD, JR

